- packages/auth: Argon2id password hashing, JWT access tokens (jose),
opaque refresh tokens with rotation, generic error messages (no
user-enumeration via timing or message differences)
- roles/permissions/role_permissions/user_roles/sessions/audit_logs schema
(agente.md secoes 142-150); RBAC scope PLATFORM vs TENANT
- withUserContext(): narrow RLS exception so a user can discover their own
tenant_memberships before a tenant is chosen (login flow)
- userHasPermission()/isPlatformUser(): explicit service-layer RBAC checks
(roles/permissions tables are not RLS-protected — documented why in
docs/AUTHENTICATION.md)
- seed: permission catalog, 4 system roles, initial Platform Super Admin
(password written once to FIRST_LOGIN.txt, 600, outside Git)
- automated end-to-end test: login, RBAC check, refresh rotation, logout
- users + tenant_memberships tables (tenant-scoped)
- RLS policy on tenant_memberships using set_config('app.current_tenant_id', ...)
- withTenantContext() helper for transaction-scoped tenant context
- separate non-superuser app role (b2bcall_app): the default Docker postgres
user is SUPERUSER and always bypasses RLS even with FORCE, so the app must
never connect through the migration/owner role. Documented in
docs/TENANT_ISOLATION.md.
- automated isolation test proving tenant A never sees tenant B's data
