-- PHASE 56: rotas de entrada por DID (chamada de tronco -> tenant/destino)
CREATE TABLE "inbound_routes" (
    "id" UUID NOT NULL,
    "tenant_id" UUID NOT NULL,
    "did_number" TEXT NOT NULL,
    "description" TEXT,
    "destination_context" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'default',
    "destination_number" TEXT NOT NULL,
    "enabled" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
    "created_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
    "updated_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
    "deleted_at" TIMESTAMP(3),

    CONSTRAINT "inbound_routes_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);

-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "inbound_routes_did_number_key" ON "inbound_routes"("did_number");

-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "inbound_routes_tenant_id_idx" ON "inbound_routes"("tenant_id");

-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "inbound_routes" ADD CONSTRAINT "inbound_routes_tenant_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("tenant_id") REFERENCES "tenants"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;

-- Tabela de negocio tenant-scoped: RLS obrigatorio (ver docs/TENANT_ISOLATION.md).
-- didNumber e' @unique GLOBAL de proposito (mesma excecao ja aceita em
-- Tenant.telephonyDomain) -- e' a UNICA forma de descobrir de qual tenant
-- e' uma chamada de entrada ANTES de identificar o tenant. A resolucao em
-- apps/freeswitch-config faz fan-out sobre tenants ativos com
-- withTenantContext (nunca uma query sem contexto), entao RLS continua
-- valendo de verdade aqui, igual toda outra tabela de negocio.
ALTER TABLE "inbound_routes" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "inbound_routes" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation" ON "inbound_routes"
  USING (tenant_id = NULLIF(current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true), '')::uuid);