Files
B2BCall-dialer/TODO.md
Matheus b3b0aaacb3 feat: add FreeSWITCH service (SignalWire packages, not compiled from source)
- infrastructure/freeswitch/Dockerfile: debian:trixie-slim + SignalWire
  packaged freeswitch-meta-vanilla, avoiding a C/C++ build on a 1.9GB RAM VM
- FREESWITCH_PAT used only via Docker BuildKit secret, apt credentials file
  created and deleted within the same RUN — verified absent from the final
  image with docker history
- minimal module set (agente.md secao 15): sofia, event_socket, commands,
  dptools, callcenter, avmd, curl, local_stream, etc. mod_xml_curl installed
  but disabled — it refuses to load without a configured gateway-url, which
  will exist once b2bcall-fs-config is built
- entrypoint.sh rotates the Event Socket password away from the 'ClueCon'
  default at container runtime (never baked into the image); fails loudly if
  ESL_PASSWORD is unset
- port 8021 not published to the host; only reachable from other containers
  on the compose network
- found and fixed: freeswitch-conf-vanilla is a Recommends (not a Depends)
  of freeswitch-meta-vanilla, so --no-install-recommends silently produced
  an empty /etc/freeswitch and a crash loop
- verified end-to-end: fs_cli status via ESL with the custom password,
  default password rejected, expected modules loaded, healthcheck green,
  ~44MB RAM usage
- docs/FREESWITCH.md, docs/NETWORK_ARCHITECTURE.md (network_mode decision
  deferred until a real SIP trunk exists)
2026-08-28 06:30:25 -03:00

4.2 KiB

TODO — B2BCall

PHASE 01 — Infrastructure

  • Diagnóstico do servidor (Debian 13, 2 vCPU, ~1.9GB RAM, 26GB disco livre)
  • Docker + Docker Compose instalados
  • Estrutura de monorepo criada (apps/, packages/, infrastructure/, scripts/, docs/)
  • PostgreSQL 18 (docker-compose, porta 127.0.0.1:5432)
  • Redis 7 (docker-compose, porta 127.0.0.1:6379)
  • Secrets gerados em .env (POSTGRES_PASSWORD, REDIS_PASSWORD, JWT_SECRET, JWT_REFRESH_SECRET, ENCRYPTION_KEY, ESL_PASSWORD)
  • FREESWITCH_PAT configurado em .env (não commitado)
  • FreeSWITCH (imagem própria via pacotes SignalWire, não compilada da fonte — ver docs/FREESWITCH.md; rodando, saudável, ~44MB RAM, senha ESL customizada, nenhuma porta exposta ao host)
  • nginx (reverse proxy)

PHASE 05 — FreeSWITCH (agente.md secao 232)

  • Imagem própria (infrastructure/freeswitch/), pacotes SignalWire (PAT via BuildKit secret, nunca na imagem final — verificado com docker history)
  • Módulos mínimos carregados: sofia, event_socket, commands, dptools, callcenter, avmd, curl, local_stream, etc. (mod_xml_curl instalado mas desativado até existir b2bcall-fs-config)
  • Senha do Event Socket trocada da padrão via entrypoint runtime (nunca fica na imagem); porta 8021 não publicada no host
  • docs/FREESWITCH.md, docs/NETWORK_ARCHITECTURE.md (decisão de network_mode adiada pra quando existir tronco SIP real)
  • Diretório/dialplan ainda são os estáticos da config vanilla (ramais de teste 1000-1019, senhas fracas) — substituir por mod_xml_curl na fase Extensions/Trunks/Dialplan

PHASE 02 — SaaS Core

  • Monorepo Node.js/TypeScript (pnpm workspaces, tsconfig base)
  • Node 22 LTS + pnpm instalados no host
  • packages/database (Prisma 7 + driver adapter pg, migration inicial)
  • packages/types (TenantStatus, AgentState), packages/shared
  • Tabela tenants criada via migration (seção 29 do agente.md)

PHASE 03 — Tenant Isolation

  • Tabelas users + tenant_memberships (tenant-scoped)
  • RLS (ENABLE/FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY + policy) em tenant_memberships
  • Tenant context via set_config('app.current_tenant_id', ..., true) (transaction-local)
  • Helper withTenantContext() em packages/database
  • Role de banco separado para runtime (b2bcall_app, sem SUPERUSER/BYPASSRLS) — achado crítico: o role padrão do Docker Postgres é SUPERUSER e SEMPRE ignora RLS, até com FORCE. Ver docs/TENANT_ISOLATION.md.
  • Teste automatizado de isolamento (pnpm --filter @b2bcall/database run test:isolation)

PHASE 04 — Authentication / RBAC

  • packages/auth: hash Argon2id (@node-rs/argon2), JWT access token (jose), refresh token opaco com rotation
  • Tabelas roles, permissions, role_permissions, user_roles, sessions, audit_logs
  • login() / refreshSession() / logout() / listUserTenants() / setActiveTenant()
  • userHasPermission() (RBAC com scope PLATFORM/TENANT)
  • Seed: catálogo de permissions + roles de sistema + Platform Super Admin inicial (senha em FIRST_LOGIN.txt, fora do Git, mustChangePassword=true)
  • Teste automatizado (pnpm --filter @b2bcall/auth run test:auth)
  • apps/api (NestJS + Fastify): endpoints de auth, JwtAuthGuard, DomainExceptionFilter, rate limit de login via Redis (5/min por IP e por e-mail), helmet/cors, health checks — testado ponta a ponta com curl (login, refresh rotation, logout, RBAC, 401/403/429)
  • Password reset por e-mail — depende de SMTP configurado

PHASE 06+ — ver agente.md seções 21 em diante (Event Socket, XML Curl, Telefonia,

Call Center, Predictive Dialer, Recordings, AI, Billing, Frontend, Reports, Security, Tests)


Riscos conhecidos

  • RAM da VM (1.9GB total): medido com Postgres+Redis+FreeSWITCH rodando juntos — ~91MB no total (Postgres 37MB, Redis 10MB, FreeSWITCH 44MB), bem tranquilo. O risco real ainda não testado é o build/runtime do Next.js (frontend) e vários workers Node simultâneos — reavaliar quando chegarmos lá.
  • Disco (26GB livre): build do FreeSWITCH + imagens Docker + gravações vão consumir espaço rápido. Monitorar com df -h.