Bootstrap EDEN: Fase 0 (arquitetura) e Fase 1 (monorepo + infra)

Fase 0 — descoberta e arquitetura:
- Inventário do projeto, glossário de domínio, arquitetura com bounded
  contexts e topologia de containers, threat model inicial.
- 12 ADRs cobrindo modular monolith, topologia de containers (Postgres
  isolado + eden-core/parceiros/assinante em containers e portas
  distintos), auth/sessões, modelo de permissões, criptografia/segredos,
  contrato first-class, stock ledger, separação billing/finance/fiscal,
  outbox transacional, adapters SaperX e Focus NFe, e identidade
  compartilhada entre as 3 apps.
- 14 subagentes e 7 skills especializados por domínio em .claude/.
- Hooks de segurança (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop) testados via pipe.

Fase 1 — plataforma (em andamento):
- Monorepo pnpm workspaces + Turborepo: apps/{api,worker,core-web,
  reseller-web,subscriber-web} + 9 packages compartilhados.
- apps/api: NestJS mínimo com /health/live e /health/ready (checando
  Postgres real via @eden/database).
- 3 frontends Vite + React + TypeScript + Tailwind, com o favicon
  oficial do EDEN.
- packages/database: migration baseline (node-pg-migrate) criando
  roles/role_permissions/applications/users/user_applications/sessions/
  audit_log — audit log append-only com hash-chain, testado ao vivo
  (UPDATE/DELETE bloqueados pelo trigger).
- compose.yaml implementando a topologia da ADR-0002, validada de ponta
  a ponta: os 6 containers sobem e ficam saudáveis com um único
  `docker compose up`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.claude/skills/eden-security/references/security-baseline.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Security baseline — every EDEN endpoint
+
+Checklist (Master Prompt §12):
+- Security headers (helmet-equivalent) + adequate CSP.
+- CORS by allowlist per environment (legacy had none configured — deliberate improvement).
+- Server-side input validation, output encoding, parameterized queries only (never string-concat SQL).
+- File upload: real MIME validation, size limits, stored outside webroot, malware-scan hook point.
+- Rate limiting: by IP AND by identity/token for sensitive routes (never just one dimension — legacy pattern, keep it).
+- Anti-enumeration on auth flows (forgot-password always returns success regardless of whether the email exists).
+- Authorization resolved server-side from session — never trust `role`/`customer_id`/`reseller_id`/`legal_entity_id` from the client.
+- Mass-assignment protection (explicit field allowlist on every PATCH, mirroring the legacy pattern of CPF/CNPJ never being in the admin-PATCH allowlist).
+- SSRF prevention on anything that renders external content (PDF renderer must never navigate the network — `setContent` only, block all outgoing requests).
+- Request size limits, secure cookie/token handling, dependency scanning, secret scanning in CI.