Bootstrap EDEN: Fase 0 (arquitetura) e Fase 1 (monorepo + infra)

Fase 0 — descoberta e arquitetura:
- Inventário do projeto, glossário de domínio, arquitetura com bounded
  contexts e topologia de containers, threat model inicial.
- 12 ADRs cobrindo modular monolith, topologia de containers (Postgres
  isolado + eden-core/parceiros/assinante em containers e portas
  distintos), auth/sessões, modelo de permissões, criptografia/segredos,
  contrato first-class, stock ledger, separação billing/finance/fiscal,
  outbox transacional, adapters SaperX e Focus NFe, e identidade
  compartilhada entre as 3 apps.
- 14 subagentes e 7 skills especializados por domínio em .claude/.
- Hooks de segurança (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop) testados via pipe.

Fase 1 — plataforma (em andamento):
- Monorepo pnpm workspaces + Turborepo: apps/{api,worker,core-web,
  reseller-web,subscriber-web} + 9 packages compartilhados.
- apps/api: NestJS mínimo com /health/live e /health/ready (checando
  Postgres real via @eden/database).
- 3 frontends Vite + React + TypeScript + Tailwind, com o favicon
  oficial do EDEN.
- packages/database: migration baseline (node-pg-migrate) criando
  roles/role_permissions/applications/users/user_applications/sessions/
  audit_log — audit log append-only com hash-chain, testado ao vivo
  (UPDATE/DELETE bloqueados pelo trigger).
- compose.yaml implementando a topologia da ADR-0002, validada de ponta
  a ponta: os 6 containers sobem e ficam saudáveis com um único
  `docker compose up`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.claude/skills/eden-timeclock/references/afd-671.md

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+# AFD (Portaria MTP 671/2021) conventions
+
+- Layout version 004, ISO-8859-1 text, `\r\n` line separators. Each line: 9-digit NSR + 1-digit record type.
+- Only decode fields with an exactly-documented byte position; anything undocumented goes into a raw-tail capture — never guessed.
+- CRC-16/KERMIT (poly 0x1021 reflected as 0x8408, init 0x0000, no final XOR) validates record types 2/3/4. Type 7 uses its own hash chain (never recomputed). Types 1/5/6/9 have no validatable CRC.
+- CPF normalization: take the last 11 numeric digits of the raw field (never assume exact formatting) — same rule used to match against `timeclock_employees.cpf` and to relink orphaned records.
+- Idempotency: whole-file (SHA-256) at import time, per-record (`device_id + nsr` unique) at insert time.
+- `afd_records` is immutable — invalid/unsupported-layout rows are still inserted (never discarded), just excluded from the apuração calculation (`validation_status IN ('VALID','WARNING')` filter).
+- Apuração timezone is always fixed `America/Sao_Paulo`, independent of server timezone (Brazil has had no DST since 2019).
+- Tolerance (Art. 58 §1º CLT): per-event tolerance capped by a daily aggregate budget, both configurable per work schedule, not hardcoded.

.claude/skills/eden-timeclock/references/controlid.md

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+# Control iD (REP iDClass) integration conventions
+
+- Transport quirk: the device's firmware sends LF-only line terminators for most headers but still closes with `\r\n\r\n` before the body — this breaks strict HTTP/1.1 parsers (Node's `llhttp`). Communicate via raw socket (`net`/`tls`), building the request manually, with a tolerant response parser trying multiple header/body boundary separators.
+- Credential storage: AES-256-GCM, reversible (the app must recover the plaintext password to authenticate against the device on demand) — see `eden-security` skill's `encryption.md`.
+- No persistent device session — login fresh on every operation.
+- CPF is the device's own user identifier (mode 671) — no separate "controlid_user_id" concept.
+- CPF travels as a `Number` in the Control iD API (loses leading zeros by design of their API) — always re-pad to 11 digits when reading back.
+- All device operations run sequentially, never in parallel — embedded devices are low-throughput; batch operations (test-all-connections, sync-all-employees) iterate one device/employee at a time.
+- Categorize errors (auth/timeout/http/invalid-response/unreachable/tls/unknown) and translate to a user-facing message — never leak raw technical error text to the end user.