feat(api,ui): MFA/TOTP, Inventory, Support, HR-Timeclock, Fiscal, Billing e Design System

Leva grande, pedida como "pelo menos mais 20 etapas, use subagentes":
fecha a pendência de MFA/TOTP da Fase 1 (feito diretamente, autenticação é
sensível demais para delegar) e lança 5 subagentes em paralelo em 2 ondas
(eden-inventory, eden-support, eden-hr-timeclock; depois eden-finance,
eden-fiscal, eden-frontend), cada um em worktree isolado, com integração
seletiva manual (barrel, app.module.ts, migrations renomeadas/aplicadas,
build/typecheck/teste ao vivo antes de cada merge).

## Backend

- MFA/TOTP (`apps/api/src/auth/mfa.service.ts`, `crypto/field-encryption.service.ts`):
  login em duas etapas quando `mfa_enabled=true`, `FieldEncryptionService`
  genérico (AES-256-GCM versionado, ADR-0005) reaproveitado por outros
  segredos reversíveis (ex. credencial de equipamento Control iD).
- Inventory: warehouses, stock_movements (ledger append-only), serialized_assets,
  asset_assignments, stock_reservations — invariante "serial/patrimônio/MAC
  nunca duplicado entre ativos ativos" reforçada por índices únicos parciais
  no banco (Master Prompt §15.3).
- Support/Service Desk: tickets com máquina de estados, SLA com pausa/retomada
  em `waiting_customer`/`waiting_third_party` (funções puras testáveis).
- HR-Timeclock (fundação): dispositivos Control iD (senha cifrada), import de
  AFD com parser + CRC-16/KERMIT, `afd_records` imutável sem exceção nem
  para super_admin (sem válvula de escape, diferente de audit_log).
- Fiscal: NCM/CFOP/municípios/naturezas de operação (eden.md módulo 5, MVP de
  5 das ~19 tabelas), product_fiscal_profiles com invariante de único
  profile ativo por billing_component.
- Billing: subscription→billing_run→invoice idempotente (regenerar em draft
  substitui, nunca duplica) e imutável após consolidar (ADR-0008: nunca
  confunde faturamento/documento fiscal/recebimento).
- FKs cruzadas fechadas: quotes/client_registrations/contracts.

## Frontend — primeira leva

- `packages/ui`: Design System real extraído do tema DreamsERP comprado —
  achado que mudou o escopo: o tema já vem em React+Tailwind (não só
  Angular), tokens visuais reais portados (cores, Geist como fonte real,
  divergindo da doc antiga que citava Nunito/Poppins).
- `apps/core-web`: login real (com suporte a MFA), sessão, shell autenticado
  via `AppShell` — substitui a tela estática "Bootstrap da Fase 1".

## Bugs reais encontrados e corrigidos (todos via teste ao vivo, não leitura)

1. **Segurança**: o token de desafio MFA era aceito como access token normal
   pelo `JwtAuthGuard` (mesma assinatura, nenhuma checagem da claim
   `purpose`) — bypass total do segundo fator. Explorado e fechado ao vivo
   contra o container real; teste de regressão em `test/mfa.spec.ts`.
2. Crase solta dentro de comentário SQL na migration de hr-timeclock quebrava
   o template literal JS (`SyntaxError` ao rodar a migration).
3. CORS ausente por completo na API.
4. `turbo.json` não declarava `VITE_API_BASE_URL` como input de build — o
   Turborepo cacheava o bundle do frontend ignorando mudança na env var.
5. `compose.yaml` usava `${VITE_API_BASE_URL:-/api/v1}`, que colidia com a
   variável de mesmo nome do `.env` local — o default nunca era aplicado.
6. Não existia `.dockerignore` — todo build copiava node_modules/.git/
   worktrees de subagentes (665MB) para dentro do contexto Docker.

Decisão do operador incorporada: a API nunca tem domínio público próprio
(só IP interno) — os 3 frontends chamam por caminho relativo `/api/v1`,
proxy externo roteia same-origin; CORS só é relevante para dev local.

Verificado: `pnpm turbo run typecheck build` (28/28), `pnpm --filter
@eden/api test` (30/30, cresceu de 15), todo o lote testado ao vivo via
curl contra os containers reais reconstruídos, incluindo os 6 bugs acima
já fechados e confirmados, e a trilha de auditoria conferida no Postgres.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BcWWuKfykGtUweXmHD6cKx

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts

@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ import { Body, Controller, Get, HttpCode, Post, Req, UseGuards } from "@nestjs/c
 import { ApiBearerAuth, ApiTags } from "@nestjs/swagger";
 import type { Request } from "express";
 import { AuthService } from "./auth.service.js";
+import { MfaService } from "./mfa.service.js";
 import { LoginDto } from "./dto/login.dto.js";
 import { RefreshDto } from "./dto/refresh.dto.js";
+import { MfaChallengeDto } from "./dto/mfa-challenge.dto.js";
+import { MfaCodeDto } from "./dto/mfa-code.dto.js";
 import { JwtAuthGuard } from "./jwt-auth.guard.js";
 import { CurrentUser } from "./decorators/current-user.decorator.js";
 import type { EdenAuthenticatedUser } from "./jwt-auth.guard.js";
@@ -18,7 +21,10 @@ function requestContext(req: Request) {
 @ApiTags("auth")
 @Controller("v1/auth")
 export class AuthController {
-  constructor(private readonly auth: AuthService) {}
+  constructor(
+    private readonly auth: AuthService,
+    private readonly mfaService: MfaService,
+  ) {}
 
   @Post("login")
   @HttpCode(200)
@@ -26,6 +32,35 @@ export class AuthController {
     return this.auth.login(dto.email, dto.password, dto.applicationKey, requestContext(req));
   }
 
+  @Post("mfa/challenge")
+  @HttpCode(200)
+  async mfaChallenge(@Body() dto: MfaChallengeDto, @Req() req: Request) {
+    return this.auth.completeMfaLogin(dto.mfaChallenge, dto.code, requestContext(req));
+  }
+
+  @Post("mfa/enroll")
+  @ApiBearerAuth()
+  @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
+  async mfaEnroll(@CurrentUser() user: EdenAuthenticatedUser) {
+    return this.mfaService.startEnrollment(user.id, user.email);
+  }
+
+  @Post("mfa/confirm")
+  @HttpCode(204)
+  @ApiBearerAuth()
+  @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
+  async mfaConfirm(@Body() dto: MfaCodeDto, @CurrentUser() user: EdenAuthenticatedUser) {
+    await this.mfaService.confirmEnrollment(user.id, dto.code);
+  }
+
+  @Post("mfa/disable")
+  @HttpCode(204)
+  @ApiBearerAuth()
+  @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
+  async mfaDisable(@Body() dto: MfaCodeDto, @CurrentUser() user: EdenAuthenticatedUser) {
+    await this.mfaService.disable(user.id, dto.code);
+  }
+
   @Post("refresh")
   @HttpCode(200)
   async refresh(@Body() dto: RefreshDto, @Req() req: Request) {

apps/api/src/auth/auth.module.ts

@@ -3,13 +3,24 @@ import { AuthController } from "./auth.controller.js";
 import { AuthService } from "./auth.service.js";
 import { PasswordService } from "./password.service.js";
 import { TokenService } from "./token.service.js";
+import { MfaService } from "./mfa.service.js";
 import { JwtAuthGuard } from "./jwt-auth.guard.js";
 import { PermissionGuard } from "./permission.guard.js";
 import { SuperAdminGuard } from "./super-admin.guard.js";
+import { FieldEncryptionService } from "../crypto/field-encryption.service.js";
 
 @Module({
   controllers: [AuthController],
-  providers: [AuthService, PasswordService, TokenService, JwtAuthGuard, PermissionGuard, SuperAdminGuard],
+  providers: [
+    AuthService,
+    PasswordService,
+    TokenService,
+    MfaService,
+    FieldEncryptionService,
+    JwtAuthGuard,
+    PermissionGuard,
+    SuperAdminGuard,
+  ],
   exports: [PasswordService, TokenService, JwtAuthGuard, PermissionGuard, SuperAdminGuard],
 })
 export class AuthModule {}

apps/api/src/auth/auth.service.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { ForbiddenException, Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from "@nestjs/c
 import { usersRepo, sessionsRepo, auditRepo, type User } from "@eden/database";
 import { PasswordService } from "./password.service.js";
 import { TokenService } from "./token.service.js";
+import { MfaService } from "./mfa.service.js";
 import { resolvePermissions } from "./permissions.js";
 
 export interface RequestContext {
@@ -16,6 +17,14 @@ export interface AuthResult {
   user: PublicUser;
 }
 
+export interface MfaRequiredResult {
+  mfaRequired: true;
+  mfaChallenge: string;
+  expiresIn: number;
+}
+
+export type LoginResult = AuthResult | MfaRequiredResult;
+
 export interface PublicUser {
   id: string;
   email: string;
@@ -34,6 +43,7 @@ export class AuthService {
   constructor(
     private readonly passwords: PasswordService,
     private readonly tokens: TokenService,
+    private readonly mfa: MfaService,
   ) {}
 
   async login(
@@ -41,7 +51,7 @@ export class AuthService {
     password: string,
     applicationKey: "core" | "reseller" | "subscriber",
     ctx: RequestContext,
-  ): Promise<AuthResult> {
+  ): Promise<LoginResult> {
     const user = await usersRepo.findUserByEmail(email);
 
     // Same generic error whether the account doesn't exist or the password
@@ -65,6 +75,20 @@ export class AuthService {
       throw new ForbiddenException("Usuário sem acesso a esta aplicação");
     }
 
+    if (user.mfa_enabled) {
+      const challenge = this.tokens.signMfaChallenge({ sub: user.id, app: applicationKey });
+      await auditRepo.appendAuditEvent({
+        actorType: "user",
+        actorId: user.id,
+        action: "auth.mfa_challenge_issued",
+        resourceType: "user",
+        resourceId: user.id,
+        metadata: { applicationKey },
+        ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      });
+      return { mfaRequired: true, mfaChallenge: challenge.token, expiresIn: challenge.expiresIn };
+    }
+
     const result = await this.issueTokens(user, applicationKey, ctx);
 
     await auditRepo.appendAuditEvent({
@@ -80,6 +104,47 @@ export class AuthService {
     return result;
   }
 
+  /** Second step of login when the account has MFA enabled — exchanges a password-verified challenge + TOTP code for real tokens. */
+  async completeMfaLogin(challengeToken: string, code: string, ctx: RequestContext): Promise<AuthResult> {
+    let payload;
+    try {
+      payload = this.tokens.verifyMfaChallenge(challengeToken);
+    } catch {
+      throw new UnauthorizedException("Desafio MFA inválido ou expirado");
+    }
+
+    const user = await usersRepo.findUserById(payload.sub);
+    if (!user || !user.is_active || !user.mfa_enabled || !user.mfa_secret_encrypted) {
+      throw new UnauthorizedException("Desafio MFA inválido ou expirado");
+    }
+
+    if (!(await this.mfa.verifyCode(user.mfa_secret_encrypted, code))) {
+      await auditRepo.appendAuditEvent({
+        actorType: "user",
+        actorId: user.id,
+        action: "auth.mfa_challenge_failed",
+        resourceType: "user",
+        resourceId: user.id,
+        ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      });
+      throw new UnauthorizedException("Código inválido");
+    }
+
+    const result = await this.issueTokens(user, payload.app, ctx);
+
+    await auditRepo.appendAuditEvent({
+      actorType: "user",
+      actorId: user.id,
+      action: "auth.login",
+      resourceType: "user",
+      resourceId: user.id,
+      metadata: { applicationKey: payload.app, viaMfa: true },
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+    });
+
+    return result;
+  }
+
   async refresh(refreshTokenPlaintext: string, ctx: RequestContext): Promise<AuthResult> {
     const hash = this.tokens.hashRefreshToken(refreshTokenPlaintext);
     const active = await sessionsRepo.findActiveSessionByRefreshTokenHash(hash);

apps/api/src/auth/dto/mfa-challenge.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { IsString, Length, MinLength } from "class-validator";
+
+export class MfaChallengeDto {
+  @IsString()
+  @MinLength(1)
+  mfaChallenge!: string;
+
+  @IsString()
+  @Length(6, 6)
+  code!: string;
+}

apps/api/src/auth/dto/mfa-code.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+import { IsString, Length } from "class-validator";
+
+export class MfaCodeDto {
+  @IsString()
+  @Length(6, 6)
+  code!: string;
+}

apps/api/src/auth/mfa.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+import { BadRequestException, Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { generateSecret, generateURI, verify } from "otplib";
+import { usersRepo } from "@eden/database";
+import { FieldEncryptionService } from "../crypto/field-encryption.service.js";
+
+const ISSUER = "EDEN";
+
+@Injectable()
+export class MfaService {
+  constructor(private readonly fieldEncryption: FieldEncryptionService) {}
+
+  /** Stages a new TOTP secret (not yet active — see confirmEnrollment). */
+  async startEnrollment(userId: string, email: string): Promise<{ secret: string; otpauthUrl: string }> {
+    const secret = generateSecret();
+    await usersRepo.setMfaSecret(userId, this.fieldEncryption.encrypt(secret));
+    const otpauthUrl = generateURI({ issuer: ISSUER, label: email, secret });
+    return { secret, otpauthUrl };
+  }
+
+  /** Verifies the first code against the staged secret and flips mfa_enabled on. */
+  async confirmEnrollment(userId: string, code: string): Promise<void> {
+    const user = await usersRepo.findUserById(userId);
+    if (!user?.mfa_secret_encrypted) {
+      throw new BadRequestException("Nenhum cadastro de MFA pendente para este usuário");
+    }
+    if (!(await this.verifyCode(user.mfa_secret_encrypted, code))) {
+      throw new BadRequestException("Código inválido");
+    }
+    await usersRepo.confirmMfaEnrollment(userId);
+  }
+
+  /** Requires a currently-valid code — proves the factor, not just an authenticated session. */
+  async disable(userId: string, code: string): Promise<void> {
+    const user = await usersRepo.findUserById(userId);
+    if (!user?.mfa_enabled || !user.mfa_secret_encrypted) {
+      throw new BadRequestException("MFA não está habilitado para este usuário");
+    }
+    if (!(await this.verifyCode(user.mfa_secret_encrypted, code))) {
+      throw new UnauthorizedException("Código inválido");
+    }
+    await usersRepo.disableMfa(userId);
+  }
+
+  async verifyCode(encryptedSecret: string, code: string): Promise<boolean> {
+    const secret = this.fieldEncryption.decrypt(encryptedSecret);
+    const result = await verify({ token: code, secret });
+    return result.valid;
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/auth/token.service.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ export interface AccessTokenPayload {
 
 const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60; // 15 min — ADR-0003
 const REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS = 30;
+const MFA_CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 2 * 60;
+const MFA_CHALLENGE_PURPOSE = "mfa_challenge" as const;
+
+export interface MfaChallengePayload {
+  sub: string;
+  app: "core" | "reseller" | "subscriber";
+  purpose: typeof MFA_CHALLENGE_PURPOSE;
+}
 
 @Injectable()
 export class TokenService {
@@ -26,7 +34,18 @@ export class TokenService {
   }
 
   verifyAccessToken(token: string): AccessTokenPayload {
-    return jwt.verify(token, this.secret) as AccessTokenPayload;
+    const payload = jwt.verify(token, this.secret) as AccessTokenPayload & { purpose?: unknown };
+    // Both token kinds are signed with the same secret, so signature
+    // verification alone doesn't distinguish them — a real access token
+    // must never carry a `purpose` claim (only single-purpose tokens like
+    // the MFA challenge do). Without this check, a password-verified MFA
+    // challenge token would be indistinguishable from a full access token
+    // and grant complete API access without ever checking the second
+    // factor — this was caught live (a real bug, not hypothetical).
+    if (payload.purpose !== undefined) {
+      throw new Error("Token não é um access token válido");
+    }
+    return payload;
   }
 
   /** Opaque, high-entropy refresh token — never a JWT (ADR-0003). Returns the
@@ -42,4 +61,27 @@ export class TokenService {
   hashRefreshToken(plaintext: string): string {
     return createHash("sha256").update(plaintext).digest("hex");
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Short-lived, single-purpose token issued after password verification
+   * when the account has MFA enabled — proves "password already checked"
+   * without granting API access. The `purpose` claim is what keeps this
+   * out of JwtAuthGuard (see verifyAccessToken's explicit rejection of any
+   * `purpose` claim) — without it this token would be a fully valid
+   * access token, defeating MFA entirely.
+   */
+  signMfaChallenge(payload: Omit<MfaChallengePayload, "purpose">): { token: string; expiresIn: number } {
+    const token = jwt.sign({ ...payload, purpose: MFA_CHALLENGE_PURPOSE }, this.secret, {
+      expiresIn: MFA_CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS,
+    });
+    return { token, expiresIn: MFA_CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS };
+  }
+
+  verifyMfaChallenge(token: string): MfaChallengePayload {
+    const payload = jwt.verify(token, this.secret) as Partial<MfaChallengePayload>;
+    if (payload.purpose !== MFA_CHALLENGE_PURPOSE || !payload.sub || !payload.app) {
+      throw new Error("Token de desafio MFA inválido");
+    }
+    return payload as MfaChallengePayload;
+  }
 }