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feat(api,ui): MFA/TOTP, Inventory, Support, HR-Timeclock, Fiscal, Billing e Design System

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Leva grande, pedida como "pelo menos mais 20 etapas, use subagentes":
fecha a pendência de MFA/TOTP da Fase 1 (feito diretamente, autenticação é
sensível demais para delegar) e lança 5 subagentes em paralelo em 2 ondas
(eden-inventory, eden-support, eden-hr-timeclock; depois eden-finance,
eden-fiscal, eden-frontend), cada um em worktree isolado, com integração
seletiva manual (barrel, app.module.ts, migrations renomeadas/aplicadas,
build/typecheck/teste ao vivo antes de cada merge).

## Backend

- MFA/TOTP (`apps/api/src/auth/mfa.service.ts`, `crypto/field-encryption.service.ts`):
  login em duas etapas quando `mfa_enabled=true`, `FieldEncryptionService`
  genérico (AES-256-GCM versionado, ADR-0005) reaproveitado por outros
  segredos reversíveis (ex. credencial de equipamento Control iD).
- Inventory: warehouses, stock_movements (ledger append-only), serialized_assets,
  asset_assignments, stock_reservations — invariante "serial/patrimônio/MAC
  nunca duplicado entre ativos ativos" reforçada por índices únicos parciais
  no banco (Master Prompt §15.3).
- Support/Service Desk: tickets com máquina de estados, SLA com pausa/retomada
  em `waiting_customer`/`waiting_third_party` (funções puras testáveis).
- HR-Timeclock (fundação): dispositivos Control iD (senha cifrada), import de
  AFD com parser + CRC-16/KERMIT, `afd_records` imutável sem exceção nem
  para super_admin (sem válvula de escape, diferente de audit_log).
- Fiscal: NCM/CFOP/municípios/naturezas de operação (eden.md módulo 5, MVP de
  5 das ~19 tabelas), product_fiscal_profiles com invariante de único
  profile ativo por billing_component.
- Billing: subscription→billing_run→invoice idempotente (regenerar em draft
  substitui, nunca duplica) e imutável após consolidar (ADR-0008: nunca
  confunde faturamento/documento fiscal/recebimento).
- FKs cruzadas fechadas: quotes/client_registrations/contracts.

## Frontend — primeira leva

- `packages/ui`: Design System real extraído do tema DreamsERP comprado —
  achado que mudou o escopo: o tema já vem em React+Tailwind (não só
  Angular), tokens visuais reais portados (cores, Geist como fonte real,
  divergindo da doc antiga que citava Nunito/Poppins).
- `apps/core-web`: login real (com suporte a MFA), sessão, shell autenticado
  via `AppShell` — substitui a tela estática "Bootstrap da Fase 1".

## Bugs reais encontrados e corrigidos (todos via teste ao vivo, não leitura)

1. **Segurança**: o token de desafio MFA era aceito como access token normal
   pelo `JwtAuthGuard` (mesma assinatura, nenhuma checagem da claim
   `purpose`) — bypass total do segundo fator. Explorado e fechado ao vivo
   contra o container real; teste de regressão em `test/mfa.spec.ts`.
2. Crase solta dentro de comentário SQL na migration de hr-timeclock quebrava
   o template literal JS (`SyntaxError` ao rodar a migration).
3. CORS ausente por completo na API.
4. `turbo.json` não declarava `VITE_API_BASE_URL` como input de build — o
   Turborepo cacheava o bundle do frontend ignorando mudança na env var.
5. `compose.yaml` usava `${VITE_API_BASE_URL:-/api/v1}`, que colidia com a
   variável de mesmo nome do `.env` local — o default nunca era aplicado.
6. Não existia `.dockerignore` — todo build copiava node_modules/.git/
   worktrees de subagentes (665MB) para dentro do contexto Docker.

Decisão do operador incorporada: a API nunca tem domínio público próprio
(só IP interno) — os 3 frontends chamam por caminho relativo `/api/v1`,
proxy externo roteia same-origin; CORS só é relevante para dev local.

Verificado: `pnpm turbo run typecheck build` (28/28), `pnpm --filter
@eden/api test` (30/30, cresceu de 15), todo o lote testado ao vivo via
curl contra os containers reais reconstruídos, incluindo os 6 bugs acima
já fechados e confirmados, e a trilha de auditoria conferida no Postgres.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BcWWuKfykGtUweXmHD6cKx

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Matheus (Handix)
2026-09-03 17:25:31 -03:00
parent 18838a9031
commit eff515b70d
105 changed files with 8875 additions and 21 deletions
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148
apps/api/test/mfa.spec.ts Normal file
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import { INestApplication } from "@nestjs/common";
import { generate } from "otplib";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
agent,
bearer,
closeTestApp,
createTestApp,
loginSuperAdmin,
qaEmail,
type AuthedTokens,
} from "./setup.js";
/**
* Protects the MFA/TOTP invariants added in apps/api/src/auth/mfa.service.ts
* and the login-flow branch in auth.service.ts. Boots the real app against
* the real Postgres (same pattern as auth.spec.ts) — codes are generated
* for real via `otplib.generate` against the plaintext secret returned by
* the real enroll endpoint, never faked.
*/
describe("auth — MFA/TOTP (login step-up)", () => {
let app: INestApplication;
let admin: AuthedTokens;
let fixtureEmail: string;
let fixtureUserId: string;
let fixturePassword: string;
let fixtureAccessToken: string;
let secret: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
app = await createTestApp();
admin = await loginSuperAdmin(app);
fixtureEmail = qaEmail("mfa");
const invite = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/users/invite")
.set(...bearer(admin.accessToken))
.send({ email: fixtureEmail, roleKey: "user", applications: ["core"] })
.expect(201);
fixtureUserId = invite.body.user.id;
fixturePassword = invite.body.tempPassword;
const login = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/login")
.send({ email: fixtureEmail, password: fixturePassword, applicationKey: "core" })
.expect(200);
fixtureAccessToken = login.body.accessToken as string;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await agent(app)
.patch(`/api/v1/users/${fixtureUserId}`)
.set(...bearer(admin.accessToken))
.send({ isActive: false })
.expect(200);
await closeTestApp(app);
});
it("login before enrollment returns tokens directly (no mfaRequired)", async () => {
const res = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/login")
.send({ email: fixtureEmail, password: fixturePassword, applicationKey: "core" })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.accessToken).toBeTypeOf("string");
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBeUndefined();
});
it("confirming enrollment with a wrong code is rejected and does not enable MFA", async () => {
const enroll = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll")
.set(...bearer(fixtureAccessToken))
.expect(201);
secret = enroll.body.secret as string;
expect(enroll.body.otpauthUrl).toContain("otpauth://totp/");
await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/confirm")
.set(...bearer(fixtureAccessToken))
.send({ code: "000000" })
.expect(400);
// MFA must still be off — login without a code still returns tokens directly.
const res = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/login")
.send({ email: fixtureEmail, password: fixturePassword, applicationKey: "core" })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBeUndefined();
});
it("confirming enrollment with the real current code enables MFA and step-up login works end to end", async () => {
await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/confirm")
.set(...bearer(fixtureAccessToken))
.send({ code: await generate({ secret }) })
.expect(204);
// Password alone is no longer enough — login returns a challenge, not tokens.
const challenge = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/login")
.send({ email: fixtureEmail, password: fixturePassword, applicationKey: "core" })
.expect(200);
expect(challenge.body.mfaRequired).toBe(true);
expect(challenge.body.accessToken).toBeUndefined();
const mfaChallenge = challenge.body.mfaChallenge as string;
// Regression: the challenge token must NEVER work as a bearer access
// token — it's signed with the same secret as a real access token, so
// without an explicit `purpose` check it would grant full API access
// without ever verifying the second factor (caught live against the
// real running stack, not a hypothetical).
await agent(app).get("/api/v1/auth/me").set(...bearer(mfaChallenge)).expect(401);
// Wrong TOTP code is rejected.
await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/challenge")
.send({ mfaChallenge, code: "000000" })
.expect(401);
// Correct TOTP code completes login with real tokens.
const done = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/challenge")
.send({ mfaChallenge, code: await generate({ secret }) })
.expect(200);
expect(done.body.accessToken).toBeTypeOf("string");
expect(done.body.refreshToken).toBeTypeOf("string");
});
it("disabling MFA requires a valid current code, then login goes back to returning tokens directly", async () => {
await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/disable")
.set(...bearer(fixtureAccessToken))
.send({ code: "000000" })
.expect(401);
await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/disable")
.set(...bearer(fixtureAccessToken))
.send({ code: await generate({ secret }) })
.expect(204);
const res = await agent(app)
.post("/api/v1/auth/login")
.send({ email: fixtureEmail, password: fixturePassword, applicationKey: "core" })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.accessToken).toBeTypeOf("string");
});
});