import type { RateLimitRule } from "./rate-limit.decorator.js";

const MINUTE = 60_000;

/**
 * Concrete limits for every public (no-session) route in this API.
 * Numbers are deliberately round, chosen for two constraints at once:
 *  - generous enough that this project's own real-app integration test
 *    suite (apps/api/test/*.spec.ts — real login/refresh/signature flows,
 *    all from the same loopback IP) never trips them by accident;
 *  - tight enough to turn an unthrottled endpoint (previously: unlimited
 *    requests/second) into a hard, auditable ceiling per IP or per link.
 * None of these claim to fully stop a determined, IP-rotating attacker —
 * that's a documented residual risk in docs/security/threat-model.md,
 * not a gap this change pretends to close.
 */

// --- apps/api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts -----------------------------

/** Credential guessing target — argon2 already raises the per-guess cost; this caps guess *rate*. */
export const AUTH_LOGIN_RULE: RateLimitRule = { name: "auth-login", keyBy: "ip", limit: 10, windowMs: MINUTE };

/** Same order of magnitude as login: this is the second half of an MFA login, equally sensitive. */
export const AUTH_MFA_CHALLENGE_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "auth-mfa-challenge",
  keyBy: "ip",
  limit: 10,
  windowMs: MINUTE,
};

/** Doesn't leak account existence (anti-enumeration response either way), but still caps inbox-spam/abuse potential. */
export const AUTH_FORGOT_PASSWORD_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "auth-forgot-password",
  keyBy: "ip",
  limit: 10,
  windowMs: MINUTE,
};

/** Token is 256-bit random (auth.service.ts) — not brute-forceable; this is generic abuse/DoS hygiene. */
export const AUTH_RESET_PASSWORD_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "auth-reset-password",
  keyBy: "ip",
  limit: 10,
  windowMs: MINUTE,
};

/** Refresh tokens are 256-bit random too; higher ceiling because legitimate multi-tab/background refresh is frequent by design. */
export const AUTH_REFRESH_RULE: RateLimitRule = { name: "auth-refresh", keyBy: "ip", limit: 30, windowMs: MINUTE };

/**
 * Not in the task's original enumerated list, but POST /v1/auth/logout has
 * no JwtAuthGuard either (auth.controller.ts) — genuinely public. No
 * guessing target (needs an already-known refresh token), so this is
 * generic abuse/DoS hygiene only, same ceiling as refresh.
 */
export const AUTH_LOGOUT_RULE: RateLimitRule = { name: "auth-logout", keyBy: "ip", limit: 30, windowMs: MINUTE };

// --- apps/api/src/signatures/public-signature.controller.ts -----------

/**
 * Shared across every /v1/public-signature/:token/* handler, keyed by IP —
 * catches one source scanning/hammering many DIFFERENT tokens (link
 * enumeration or scraping), which a per-token limit alone can't see.
 */
export const PUBLIC_SIGNATURE_IP_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "pubsig-ip",
  keyBy: "ip",
  limit: 60,
  windowMs: MINUTE,
};

/**
 * Per-token ceiling for the ordinary read/ack steps of the flow — a real
 * signer hits each of these once or twice (reload, double-click); this
 * only bites automated hammering of one leaked link, from any number of
 * source IPs (that's the point of keying by token, not IP, here).
 */
export const PUBLIC_SIGNATURE_TOKEN_ACTION_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "pubsig-token-action",
  keyBy: "token",
  limit: 20,
  windowMs: 5 * MINUTE,
};

/** Sends an email — tighter, since abuse here has a real cost (spamming the signer's inbox), not just a wasted read. */
export const PUBLIC_SIGNATURE_OTP_REQUEST_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "pubsig-otp-request",
  keyBy: "token",
  limit: 5,
  windowMs: 15 * MINUTE,
};

/**
 * Complementary to the DB-persisted per-challenge lockout already in
 * public-signature.service.ts::verifyOtp (blocks after N wrong codes,
 * survives across source IPs) — this caps raw request *rate* against the
 * endpoint itself, independent of whether attempts are right or wrong.
 */
export const PUBLIC_SIGNATURE_OTP_VERIFY_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "pubsig-otp-verify",
  keyBy: "token",
  limit: 15,
  windowMs: 5 * MINUTE,
};

// --- apps/api/src/signatures/public-verify.controller.ts --------------

export const PUBLIC_VERIFY_IP_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "pubverify-ip",
  keyBy: "ip",
  limit: 60,
  windowMs: MINUTE,
};

export const PUBLIC_VERIFY_ID_RULE: RateLimitRule = {
  name: "pubverify-id",
  keyBy: "verificationId",
  limit: 30,
  windowMs: MINUTE,
};