Três achados reportados pelo usuário numa mensagem só: (1) Rotas de Entrada
não tinha edição depois de criada — implementada no mesmo padrão de Filas;
(2) telas de Platform > Infraestrutura sempre davam "Timeout no ESL" nesta
VM — não era limitação permanente como o comentário antigo dizia, e sim
ESL_HOST=freeswitch (nome DNS que só existe dentro da rede do Docker) mais
um segundo bug independente (`show gateways as json` não é comando válido
nesta versão do FreeSWITCH); (3) ramal externo registrava mas sem áudio —
diagnosticado com contadores de pacote do iptables: a VM está atrás de um
roteador sem port-forward pra faixa de RTP, achado de infraestrutura de
rede, não bug de código.
Também integra o softphone WebRTC (handphone.js/OpenSIPS, já em produção):
código-fonte encontrado em git.falehandix.com.br/Handix/handphone-2.0,
patch mínimo pra aceitar o endereço do proxy em runtime (era build-time),
nova config global (Platform > Infraestrutura > Softphone WebRTC) e widget
na topbar do tenant que pega usuário/domínio/senha do ramal vinculado ao
agente logado.
Adiciona docs/QA_SETUP.md — runbook completo pra subir o ambiente do zero
numa máquina nova (Docker, migrations, seed, systemd), e completa o
.env.example que estava faltando a maioria das variáveis reais.
Testado ponta a ponta com Playwright: edição de rota (criar/editar/F5),
as 3 telas de Infraestrutura com dado real, e um tenant/ramal/agente de
teste criados na hora confirmando que o script do softphone recebe as
credenciais certas.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BFaBaBSQGhyXGEgtTYZGV8
- extensions table (tenant-scoped, RLS): number, sip_password_enc
(AES-256-GCM via packages/shared/src/crypto.ts), caller_id, context,
sofia_profile, codecs, max_registrations
- apps/api/src/extensions: CRUD (POST/GET/GET:id/DELETE), protected by a
new generic PermissionGuard (@RequirePermission decorator), tenant
resolved only from the JWT (never trusted from the client)
- SIP password is returned in plaintext only once, in the create response;
toPublicExtension() explicitly destructures the encrypted field out
(not a spread) so it can't leak by accident
- b2bcall-fs-config now resolves real directory data: Tenant.telephonyDomain
-> Extension.number, decrypts the password, builds proper directory XML
including a dial-string param (missing it caused originate to fail with
MANDATORY_IE_MISSING instead of the expected USER_NOT_REGISTERED)
- pinned FreeSWITCH's 357737{domain} to a stable value (b2bcall.local) via a
vars.xml patch in the Dockerfile -- it previously used the container's
dynamic IP, which could never match a stored telephony_domain
- added HTTP Basic auth between FreeSWITCH and fs-config
(gateway-credentials, timingSafeEqual comparison) now that the service
returns real secret data, closing the gap flagged as pending in the XML
Curl phase instead of leaving it open
- found and fixed: PermissionGuard's constructor-injected Reflector came
back undefined at runtime under tsx/esbuild (unreliable cross-file
decorator metadata emission) -- fixed with an explicit @Inject(Reflector);
worth watching for in future guards/services run via tsx
- verified end-to-end: create extension -> originate user/<ext> reports
USER_NOT_REGISTERED (found, not registered) -> delete -> back to
SUBSCRIBER_ABSENT (not found); password never reappears in any GET;
unauthenticated fs-config requests get 401
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md
- POST /auth/login, /auth/refresh, /auth/logout, /auth/select-tenant,
/auth/change-password, GET /auth/tenants — wired to packages/auth
- JwtAuthGuard + DomainExceptionFilter (401/403 without leaking internals)
- LoginRateLimitGuard: Redis-backed 5/min per IP and per email (agente.md
secao 149), safe across multiple API instances
- helmet + restrictive cors (deny-by-default) + global rate limit
- GET /health, /health/live, /health/ready checking Postgres and Redis
- changePassword() added to packages/auth for the mustChangePassword flow
- fixed REDIS_HOST/POSTGRES_HOST docker-compose-only hostnames not
resolving from the host process; added REDIS_URL for host-side use
- verified end-to-end with curl: login, wrong password / unknown email
(same generic error), authenticated route, missing token, refresh
rotation, logout revocation, and the 429 rate limit kicking in after 5
attempts
- users + tenant_memberships tables (tenant-scoped)
- RLS policy on tenant_memberships using set_config('app.current_tenant_id', ...)
- withTenantContext() helper for transaction-scoped tenant context
- separate non-superuser app role (b2bcall_app): the default Docker postgres
user is SUPERUSER and always bypasses RLS even with FORCE, so the app must
never connect through the migration/owner role. Documented in
docs/TENANT_ISOLATION.md.
- automated isolation test proving tenant A never sees tenant B's data
