Matheus (Handix)
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Fase 0 — descoberta e arquitetura:
- Inventário do projeto, glossário de domínio, arquitetura com bounded
contexts e topologia de containers, threat model inicial.
- 12 ADRs cobrindo modular monolith, topologia de containers (Postgres
isolado + eden-core/parceiros/assinante em containers e portas
distintos), auth/sessões, modelo de permissões, criptografia/segredos,
contrato first-class, stock ledger, separação billing/finance/fiscal,
outbox transacional, adapters SaperX e Focus NFe, e identidade
compartilhada entre as 3 apps.
- 14 subagentes e 7 skills especializados por domínio em .claude/.
- Hooks de segurança (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop) testados via pipe.
Fase 1 — plataforma (em andamento):
- Monorepo pnpm workspaces + Turborepo: apps/{api,worker,core-web,
reseller-web,subscriber-web} + 9 packages compartilhados.
- apps/api: NestJS mínimo com /health/live e /health/ready (checando
Postgres real via @eden/database).
- 3 frontends Vite + React + TypeScript + Tailwind, com o favicon
oficial do EDEN.
- packages/database: migration baseline (node-pg-migrate) criando
roles/role_permissions/applications/users/user_applications/sessions/
audit_log — audit log append-only com hash-chain, testado ao vivo
(UPDATE/DELETE bloqueados pelo trigger).
- compose.yaml implementando a topologia da ADR-0002, validada de ponta
a ponta: os 6 containers sobem e ficam saudáveis com um único
`docker compose up`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Audit conventions — EDEN
Minimum audited actions (Master Prompt §5.6): login/logout/MFA, user/role/permission changes, discount approval, contract changes, price changes, stock movement, serial/MAC/asset link-unlink, fiscal document issue/cancel, financial write-off/reversal, boleto/billing changes, timeclock period reopening, subscription actions, integration secret/config changes.
Rules:
- Append-only, enforced at the database level (trigger rejecting UPDATE/DELETE outside an explicit, itself-audited escape hatch) — never rely on "the application just never calls UPDATE."
- Order of events defined by a monotonic sequence (serial/bigserial), never by timestamp alone (timestamps can collide within a transaction — see the legacy signature audit chain's
seqcolumn). - Never write a raw secret into audit metadata, ever.
super_admin-equivalent bypasses authorization but never bypasses audit.- For hash-chained audit trails (e.g., signature envelopes): version the canonicalization algorithm explicitly (
hash_algorithm_version) so a future bug fix doesn't retroactively invalidate old, correctly-recorded events — treat linkage failures as always-real tampering, content failures on outdated algorithm versions as a legacy warning, not a failure.