Matheus (Handix)
44510bd019
Fase 0 — descoberta e arquitetura:
- Inventário do projeto, glossário de domínio, arquitetura com bounded
contexts e topologia de containers, threat model inicial.
- 12 ADRs cobrindo modular monolith, topologia de containers (Postgres
isolado + eden-core/parceiros/assinante em containers e portas
distintos), auth/sessões, modelo de permissões, criptografia/segredos,
contrato first-class, stock ledger, separação billing/finance/fiscal,
outbox transacional, adapters SaperX e Focus NFe, e identidade
compartilhada entre as 3 apps.
- 14 subagentes e 7 skills especializados por domínio em .claude/.
- Hooks de segurança (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop) testados via pipe.
Fase 1 — plataforma (em andamento):
- Monorepo pnpm workspaces + Turborepo: apps/{api,worker,core-web,
reseller-web,subscriber-web} + 9 packages compartilhados.
- apps/api: NestJS mínimo com /health/live e /health/ready (checando
Postgres real via @eden/database).
- 3 frontends Vite + React + TypeScript + Tailwind, com o favicon
oficial do EDEN.
- packages/database: migration baseline (node-pg-migrate) criando
roles/role_permissions/applications/users/user_applications/sessions/
audit_log — audit log append-only com hash-chain, testado ao vivo
(UPDATE/DELETE bloqueados pelo trigger).
- compose.yaml implementando a topologia da ADR-0002, validada de ponta
a ponta: os 6 containers sobem e ficam saudáveis com um único
`docker compose up`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
9 lines
967 B
Markdown
9 lines
967 B
Markdown
# Data classification — decide before writing a new column
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Per Master Prompt §5.4. Three buckets, decide explicitly, never default to "encrypt everything":
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1. **One-way hash**: passwords, refresh tokens, public tokens that never need recovery. Argon2id for passwords (ADR-0005); SHA-256/HMAC-SHA256 for tokens depending on entropy (see `encryption.md`).
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2. **Reversible field encryption (AES-256-GCM)**: anything the application must recover in plaintext to function — integration API keys/tokens (SaperX, Focus NFe, AI providers), device credentials (Control iD), gateway secrets. Root key never in the database; versioned.
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3. **Personal data (LGPD)**: minimize collection, access-control + audit + TLS + storage encryption by default; field-level encryption only for items the threat model flags as high-risk (not blanket).
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4. **Credit card**: never store CVV; tokenize via PSP; store only token/brand/last-4/non-sensitive metadata. No homegrown card vault.
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