Files

Matheus (Handix) 44510bd019 Bootstrap EDEN: Fase 0 (arquitetura) e Fase 1 (monorepo + infra)

Fase 0 — descoberta e arquitetura:
- Inventário do projeto, glossário de domínio, arquitetura com bounded
  contexts e topologia de containers, threat model inicial.
- 12 ADRs cobrindo modular monolith, topologia de containers (Postgres
  isolado + eden-core/parceiros/assinante em containers e portas
  distintos), auth/sessões, modelo de permissões, criptografia/segredos,
  contrato first-class, stock ledger, separação billing/finance/fiscal,
  outbox transacional, adapters SaperX e Focus NFe, e identidade
  compartilhada entre as 3 apps.
- 14 subagentes e 7 skills especializados por domínio em .claude/.
- Hooks de segurança (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop) testados via pipe.

Fase 1 — plataforma (em andamento):
- Monorepo pnpm workspaces + Turborepo: apps/{api,worker,core-web,
  reseller-web,subscriber-web} + 9 packages compartilhados.
- apps/api: NestJS mínimo com /health/live e /health/ready (checando
  Postgres real via @eden/database).
- 3 frontends Vite + React + TypeScript + Tailwind, com o favicon
  oficial do EDEN.
- packages/database: migration baseline (node-pg-migrate) criando
  roles/role_permissions/applications/users/user_applications/sessions/
  audit_log — audit log append-only com hash-chain, testado ao vivo
  (UPDATE/DELETE bloqueados pelo trigger).
- compose.yaml implementando a topologia da ADR-0002, validada de ponta
  a ponta: os 6 containers sobem e ficam saudáveis com um único
  `docker compose up`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-03 08:01:14 -03:00

1.1 KiB

Raw Blame History

Encryption patterns — EDEN

See ADR-0005 for the full decision. Quick reference:

Reversible field encryption: AES-256-GCM, random 96-bit IV per operation, auth tag verified on decrypt. Storage format: {iv_b64}:{authTag_b64}:{ciphertext_b64} in a single TEXT column (legacy-proven pattern from Control iD credential storage). Root key derived via SHA-256 of an env-provided secret, normalizing any-length input to 32 bytes. Every encrypted value also stores a key_version for rotation.
OTP: HMAC-SHA256 with a server secret (never plain SHA-256 — OTP space is only 10^6, needs secret-based rainbow-table resistance). 6 digits, 5-minute TTL, single use, max attempts with lockout, invalidate-on-new-request.
Public link tokens (client/reseller registration, signature invite): CSPRNG, ≥96 bits for registration tokens, 256 bits for signature invite tokens. Stored as SHA-256 hash only (plain hash sufficient given the token's own entropy — no HMAC needed here, unlike OTP).
Passwords: Argon2id, versioned parameters (see ADR-0005), re-hash on next successful login when parameters change.

1.1 KiB Raw Blame History

Encryption patterns — EDEN

1.1 KiB

Raw Blame History